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Is Compensation for
Workplace Injuries
Adequate?
he issue of the adequacy of
compensation for workers who are
disabled by their employment generates
great controversy. State-regulated
workers' compensation programs provide
wage replacement (or "wage-loss")
benefits to workers while off work due to
a work-related disability, as well as
medical treatment and rehabilitation
services to assist such workers in
returning to work. Since employers
apparently pay the costs of workers'
compensation programs and workers
apparently derive the benefits, the
situation is ripe for misunderstanding and
hyperbole. 1 Nevertheless, policymakers
must make such judgments when they set
benefit schedules under workers'
compensation statutes.
Wage-loss benefits are usually stated
as a percentage of the worker's previous
weekly earnings; typically two-thirds of
gross wages or 80 percent of net (takehome) pay.2 The latter formula has arisen
to ensure that injured workers are not
"overcompensated" for lost wages when
viewed from an after-tax perspective,
since workers' compensation benefits are
free of all income and payroll taxes.

What is Benefit Adequacy?
Unfortunately, there is no universally
accepted definition of benefit adequacy.
The National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws
recommended 30 years ago that states
provide at least two-thirds wage
replacement up to a maximum of 200
percent of the state average weekly wage.
This standard was subsequently adopted
by the Council of State Governments in
1974 when they amended their "Model
Act for Workmen's Compensation."
Because this represents the closest thing
we have to an accepted adequacy
standard, and because 35 states actually
use two-thirds of gross wages as their
replacement formula, the Sub-committee
on Benefit Adequacy of the Workers'
Compensation Steering Committee at the
National Academy of Social Insurance
(NASI) has also been using this standard
in its review of benefit adequacy (see
www.nasi.org for more details). Given
these precedents, I will also adopt twothirds of gross wages as the measure of
adequacy.
What Does the Research Say?
Recently, three separate empirical
studies carefully explored the level of
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workers' compensation wage-loss
replacement in the states of California,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Both the
Washington and Wisconsin studies
estimated losses for the full range of
injured workers, while the California
study included only workers with
permanent partial disability benefits. All
the studies used administrative data on
actual earnings of individuals who were
not injured, or not seriously injured, to
estimate the wages that workers'
compensation claimants would have
earned in the absence of the disability.
In a recent volume published by the
Upjohn Institute for NASI, the three
primary authors of these state-specific
studies derived comparable estimates of
the losses suffered and compensation
received for permanent partial disability
(PPD) claimants in the three states (see
Budetti et al. 2001). While this analysis is
not as broad as the earlier ones (at least
for Washington and Wisconsin), it does
cover a very interesting workers'
compensation subpopulation that
accounts for about 60 percent of all
benefit payments and includes many of
the most contentious cases in the workers'
compensation programs. It is also the
group of cases which raise the most
significant questions about benefit
adequacy because of the likely
permanency of wage losses.
Workers' compensation benefits in
these studies are defined to include both
temporary and permanent wage-loss
benefits, cash settlements (which can
include payments for future medical
benefits in California and Wisconsin), and
vocational rehabilitation maintenance
allowance. For this comparison, the
authors chose to ignore the effects of
taxation, so results are presented in pretax
dollars. Injured workers are compared to
noninjured workers of similar preinjury
wage levels employed at similar (or the
same) firms. Using the wages of similar
uninjured workers standardizes the
comparison for unemployment, inflation,
job promotions, and other labor market
changes.
Benefits paid and wages lost are
measured for at least 3.5 years after the

point of injury. They are projected
beyond the observed 3.5 years by carrying
the final observed year's losses and
benefits forward for an additional 6.5
years and discounting all amounts back to
the point of observation. It is worth
noting that attorney fees and other
potential medical/legal costs have not
been deducted from the gross benefits
paid, nor have any lost fringe benefits
been counted as economic losses.3

Wage-loss replacement
adequacy seems to be better for
low-wage workers, for
employees at smaller, insured
firms, for more severely disabled
workers, and in certain states.
Table 1 shows the total wage-loss
benefits paid in the first 3.5 years
following the injury, the estimated wage
losses for the first 3.5 years, projected
losses for the 10 years following the
injury, and the estimated wage-loss
replacement rate for 10 years in
California, Wisconsin, and Washington.
Despite some differences among the
states in the method of compensating PPD
cases (although all three use disability
ratings), the replacement rates for 10-year
losses are quite similar and remarkably
low. Workers' compensation programs
replace about 38 percent of lost earnings
for injured workers with permanent

partial disabilities in California and 46
percent in Washington and Wisconsin (see
Biddle, Boden, and Reville 2001, p. 276).
After-tax replacement rates would be
higher, since workers' compensation
benefits are free of income tax. However,
it is clear that gross wage replacement
rates fall well below the two-thirds
standard generally specified by statute, at
least for this group of injured workers
with permanent partial disabilities.

Differences by Disability Rating
A major policy issue is benefit
adequacy as a function of the degree of
disability. Presumably, more seriously
disabled workers are less likely to
eventually return to work and therefore
more likely to be dependent upon
workers' compensation or other social
insurance benefits.4 Table 2 reports
projected losses for 10 years following
injury and 10-year replacement rates for
workers' compensation claimants
according to their disability rating in the
three states. The disability rating is a
rough attempt to quantify the degree to
which an individual is disabled. It
estimates the percentage of impairment to
the "whole man." This is the most
common way of setting compensation for
permanent disabilities among U.S.
jurisdictions (Barth and Niss 1999).
Since permanent partial disability
benefits are largely determined by the
disability rating, rather than vice versa,
we are looking for confirmation that

Table 1
Average Losses and Pretax Replacement Rate for Permanent Partial
Disability Cases in Three States
Losses by years from injury Replacement
($)
rate for 10-year
Total income
losses (%)
10 yr.b
3.5 yr.
benefits ($)
Statea
California

21,229

26,383

56,340

38

Washington

14,975

15,358

32,427

46

Wisconsin

14,196

17,602

30,746

46

aAll dollar values measured in constant (1984) dollars.
bProjected, assuming wage-losses and benefit payments continue at same rate as in final observed
year.
SOURCE: Biddle, Boden, and Reville (2001), p. 276.
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Table 2
The Relationship of Losses and Income Benefits
by Disability Rating
Permanent disability rating
21-40

41-60

61-80

81-100

California 1993 injuries
Losses projected 10 yr. ($)

24,120

29,948

43,107

55,754

114,226

10-yr. replacement rate (%)

7

19

29

44

54

Losses projected 10 yr. ($)

30,512

28,834

34,555

32,485

35,775

10-yr. replacement rate (%)

14

31

41

56

82

8,255

13,816

20,957

32,036

65,713

40

45

47

46

58

Washington 1993-94 injuries

Wisconsin 1989-90 injuries
Losses projected 10 yr. ($)
10-yr. replacement rate (%)

NOTE: "Benefits" means temporary plus permanent disability benefits.
SOURCE: Biddle, Boden, and Reville (2001), p. 281.

estimated wage losses increase regularly
(proportionally?) with disability rating.
Such a rinding would provide evidence
that workers' compensation systems are
at least getting the wage-loss replacement
dollars to the right people.
The table shows that while 10-year
losses increase steadily with disability
rating, at least in California and
Wisconsin, compensation more than
keeps up, as wage-loss replacement rates
rise with disability rating. This is very
pronounced in California, with
replacement rates rising from 7 percent
for the least serious injuries to 54 percent
for the most serious. Wisconsin shows a
more gradual increase, from 40 percent
replacement in the least serious to 58
percent in the most serious injuries. In
Washington, losses do not increase with
disability rating, indicating that disability
ratings are not well correlated with
earnings losses.

Conclusions
These recent studies based upon
administrative data and using carefully
selected comparison groups improve our
estimates of wage replacement adequacy
in workers' compensation programs
significantly. Research to date indicates

that wage-loss replacement adequacy
seems to be better for low-wage workers,
for employees at smaller, insured firms
(which is likely the same thing), for more
severely disabled workers, and in certain
states.
However, very few of the before-tax
replacement rates reported here even
came close to the two-thirds standard of
adequacy. Thus our conclusion must be
that workers' compensation wagereplacement benefits are not adequate, at
least for workers with permanent partial
disabilities in these particular states. As
usual, more research is needed to shed
more light on these questions.

NOTES
1. We say "apparently" because labor market
analysts believe that both costs and benefits can be
shifted between workers and their employers by the
market forces of labor supply and demand.
2. Actually 35 states maintain temporary total
workers' compensation benefits at two-thirds of
gross earnings, while 4 states use 80 percent of net,
and 2 states are at 75 percent of net. Six states pay
more than two-thirds of gross, two states pay less
than two-thirds, and one state uses a variable
replacement rate.
3. Of course, analyzing only permanent partial
disabilities also biases the wage-loss result, since
these cases are the most likely to be disputed and to
result in compromise settlements. See Barm and
Niss (1999).

4. See Barm and Niss (1999) for a description of
the variety of PPD methods.
H. Allan Hunt is Assistant Executive Director at
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
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David I. Levine
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• j(Economists often assume markets
set wages. On the contrary, for most
Americans, employers set their wages
within an internal labor market that is
often only weakly associated with a spot
market. A characterization of internal
labor markets back in the 1960s and
1970s might be that they provided an
implicit employment contract that
exchanged employees' hard work for
employment security. For lack of a better
term, we refer to that arrangement as the
"old employment contract."
During the last decade, the media have
proclaimed the death of the old
employment contract and a new emphasis
on flexibility and external, not internal,
labor markets. In fact, this
pronouncement is overstated, if not
incorrect. As Samuel Clemens remarked
upon seeing his obituary, "The news of
my death is greatly exaggerated." Data
do show that employment security may
be tempered. However, while tenure is a
bit shorter on average than it used to be,
the declines are modest for most groups
of workers.
While past research has emphasized
the length of jobs as a measure of the
strength of internal labor markets, it is
also important to understand the evolution
of complementary measures; the
divergence of pay in the internal and
external labor markets. In a forthcoming.
Upjohn Institute book (Levine et al.
2002), we present an exhaustive study
using five distinct sources of data,
including a unique data set with
information on employers and employees
in both the United States and Japan and a
new survey on fairness in employment.
We examined changes in internal labor
markets, company pay structures, and the

employment contract. Our conclusion is
that, as far as the wage setting process is
concerned, there is very little confirmation
of the existence of a "new employment
contract."

The Old Contract
In the classic old employment contract,
especially at large employers, wages were
not strongly responsive to the labor
market. Instead, each company had a
distinctive company wage level and
pattern. The implications of these patterns
were as follows:
1. Large employers pay higher wages;
2. Large and small employers reward
employee characteristics such as
age and education differently;
3. Wage levels of large and small
employers within a region are only
weakly related;
4. Wage levels among large employers
within a region have large and per
sistent deviations from each other;
5. The pattern of pay differentials
inside an internal labor market often
differ from those in the external
labor market;
6. Large employers hire higher-skilled
employees and those from demo
graphic groups managers preferred;
and
7. Employees hold strong norms
against almost any type of pay cuts.
Our study finds that these implications
are supported in the data from the 1960s
to the mid 1980s.

Have Institutions and Wage
Structures Weakened?
The standard reading of recent
business history suggests that the wage
structures associated with internal labor
markets (as described by Doeringer and
Piore in their 1971 work) weakened
between 1980 and 1996 (e.g., Cappelli
1995). If internal labor markets have
declined, we should be able to answer
"yes" to all of the following questions.
Our analyses did not find this
confirmation.
1. Did wage levels at large and small
employers become similar? Yes,
but modestly. The wage gap paid
apparently similar employees at
large (over 1000 employees) and
small employers (under 100
employees) declined from 18 per
cent in 1979 to 14 percent in 1993.
2. Did the returns on education and
tenure in large and small employers
converge? No.
3. Did the correlation between average
wages in a local labor market and
large company wages rise? No. In
neither the Current Population Sur
vey (covering 1979 to 1993) nor the
Hay data set (1986 to 1992) did the
correlation between average wages
in a local labor market and large
company wages rise.
4. Did inequality across employers
decline? No. The standard devia
tion of employer wage effects
remained near 11 percent in both
the Cleveland Salary Survey (CSS)
and Hay data sets. In addition, the
persistence of employer wage
effects remained similar in the
1990s as in the early 1980s (CSS).
5. Did the distinctiveness of wage pat
terns within an employer decline?
No. Among large employers, the
variability and persistence of dis
tinctive internal wage structures
remained constant from the early
1980s to the 1990s (CSS). Simi
larly, the differentials large firms
paid for more education, age, and
other worker characteristics did not
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come to resemble the differentials
that small firms paid.
6. Did sorting of employees decline?
Unclear. In the Hay dataset, sorting
of skills was similar in 1986 and
1992. In the Current Population
Survey, with the exception of race,
differences in the characteristics of
employees at large and small
employers either remained constant
or converged substantially between
1979 and 1993. In the CSS, the
correlation between an employers'
average wage (conditional on its
occupation mix) and the mean wage
of entry-level occupations rose by
an economically meaningful
amount.
7. Have attitudes changed to be more
accepting of the vagaries of the
market? No. Our study repeated
questions about the fairness of pay
cuts that were asked in a Canadian
study in Vancouver and Toronto in
the mid 1980s (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). When
we surveyed workers in those two
Canadian cities as well as in Silicon
Valley in the United States in 1997
and 1998, the acceptability of a pay
cut was almost identical.

Implications for Theory
Our results are surprisingly
unsupportive of any single story about
changes in wage structures at large U.S.
employers. Human capital theorists posit
a tight relationship between skills and
wages. Consistent with the hypothesis
that returns to human capital have risen,
returns to measures of skill such as
education, tenure, mean occupational
education, and Hay points rose in the
1980s and 1990s.
Nevertheless, most of our results are
inconsistent with human capital
explanations for wage differentials among
employers (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
1993; Davis and Haltiwanger 1991). In
the early period, controlling for skills did
not systematically reduce the estimated
wage gap between high- and low-wage
employers (Hay, CSS, U.S.A./Japan).
Moreover, controlling for measures of
skills did little more (CSS) or nothing

more (Hay) to undo the rising inequality
among employers. High-wage employers
remain high-wage employers even with
very detailed controls. These results
challenge all theories of wage
determination.
An important question motivating our
work was whether rising wage inequality
is related to weakening internal labor
markets. Studies using longitudinal data
on individuals conclude that rising
inequality appears to be due to job
changes, not to rising pay variance within
a career at a single employer (Gottschalk
and Moffit 1994). Our study did not
examine longitudinal data sources, but
consistent with the past research, we
found no increase in variability within
employers' wage structures over time,
implying more is at risk when people
change jobs.

As far as the wage setting
process is concerned, there
is very little confirmation
of the existence of a "new
employment contract."
Our findings of unchanged wagesetting rigidities (on average) pose a
puzzle for institutional theories of these
rigidities. Most of the rigidities
(employer wage effects, size-wage
effects, etc.) have historically been linked
to unions and to product markets
characterized by oligopolies, regulation,
and limited international competition.
The last quarter of the twentieth century
witnessed a decline in all of these
product-market rigidities, but without a
corresponding decline in rigidities in
compensation outcomes examined here.
These findings suggest that fairness
considerations and other micro-level
determinants of bargaining power and the
payoff to efficiency wages may play a
relatively larger role in determining wage
patterns and rigidities than many
researchers previously thought.

Implications for Managers
The rhetoric of the new employment
contract suggests that employers and

employees now accept external labor
markets as the best way to organize
employment. Our survey results show
that employees' norms toward pay cuts
and layoffs remain consistent with the
traditional employment contract.
Moreover, companies' pay policies,
presumably in part reflecting this stability
in norms, do not appear vastly more
flexible or market-oriented than in years
past.
For managers, our results suggest that
traditional internal labor market policies
such as minimizing layoffs may still be
useful in promoting high levels of skill
and effort. Moreover, When layoffs are
necessary, employees accept them more if
they are due to external causes such as
low sales, if top executives share the pain,
and if the firm provides notice and
assistance.

Implications for Public Policy
Employment-related policies in the
United States have often been linked to
the old employment contract. For
example, the United States is the only
industrialized nation in which an
employee's pension and health insurance
depend on his or her current employment
relationship. Training decisions after
college are largely determined by a
worker's current employer, with no
visible means of certifying to future
employers what was learned on the job.
Affirmative action policies have
emphasized increasing employment of
underrepresented groups in large
employers, based on the assumption that
jobs at large employers have aboveaverage career prospects. Unemployment
insurance and protection from many other
labor laws often do not apply to workers
with short-term or nonstandard relations
with their employer.
Does our argument that the new
employment contract is not much
different from the old contract imply that
changes in employment-related policies
are moot? Not at all. While mobility and
flexibility have not shown marked
increases, North American labor markets
have always had high mobility. Thus,
public policies based exclusively on the
old model never fit the careers and lives of
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many Americans. For example, it never
made sense for health insurance and
pensions to have been based on a model
of lifetime employment at a single firm.
Instead, public policies should encourage
portability of pensions and health
insurance. Government connection to
learning should never have stopped after
college; instead, the government should
oversee a system of industry-designed
certifications for general skills.
At the same time, the results in our
study imply that labor market policy
should not abandon the focus on creating
stable jobs. While few employers can
assure lifetime employment, most
employees still value the predictability
and relationships that come from longterm employment.
David I. Levine is an associate professor at the
Haas School of Business at the University of
California, Berkeley.

Suggestions for further reading
Cappelli, Peter. 1995. "Rethinking
Employment." British Journal of
Industrial Relations 33: 563-602.
Davis, Steve J., and John Haitiwanger.
1991. "Wage Dispersion between and
within U.S. Manufacturing Plants: 196386." Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Microeconomics 115-200.
Doeringer, Peter B., and Michael Piore,
1971. Internal Labor Markets and
Manpower Analysis. Lexington,
Massachusetts: Heath.
Gottschalk, Peter, and Robert Moffitt,
1994. "The Growth of Earnings Instability
in the U.S. Labor Market." Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2: 217 272.
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin M. Murphy, and
Brooks Pierce. 1993. "Wage Inequality
and the Rise in the Returns to Skill."
Journal of Political Economy 101(3): 410442.
'
,
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack Ktietsch, and
Richard Thaler. 1986. "Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements
in the Market." American Economic
Review 76: 728-741.
Levine, David I., Dale Belman, Gary
Gharness, Erica L. Groshen, and K.C.
O'Shaughnessy. Forthcoming. How New
Is the "New Employment Contract?"
Kalamazoo, Michigan: WT.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research.

Temporary Employment in Auto Supply
George Erickcek and Susan Houseman
at the W.E. Upjohn Institute, along with
Arne Kalleberg of the University of North
Carolina, are completing a case study on
the use of temporary agency workers by
auto suppliers in the Midwest. The
research effort is part of a larger study
being funded by the Russell Sage
Foundation that also explores the use of
flexible staffing arrangements in hospitals
and public schools.
The nonunion plants in our study
extensively used temporary agency
employment to respond to short-term
increases in production and to screen
workers for permanent positions.
Temporary help agencies enjoyed
economies of scale in recruitment and
screening. The use of temporary help
employment to screen potential workers
was especially attractive to manufacturers
when labor markets were tight and many
job applicants had marginal work
histories. Because workers were
employed by a temporary agency during
the probationary period, the manufacturer
was spared some of the financial and
emotional costs associated with dismissal,
when that became necessary.
The use of temporary agency workers
also appeared to lower labor costs for lowskilled production activities. The agency
fees charged for temporary workers were
found to be lower than the full
compensation package offered to new
direct hires. By lowering dismissal and
wage costs, temporary help agencies

facilitated employers' use of lessexperienced and otherwise riskier
workers, thereby minimizing employers'
need to increase wages to attract
experienced workers away from other
companies. The latter strategy likely
would have resulted in higher wages not
only for new hires, but also for existing
employees.
While the use of temporary agency
workers can have a negative impact on
productivity or the production error rate,
several employers organized work
stations to minimize such problems.
Well-trained permanent workers
routinely monitored the agency
temporaries and helped avert production
problems.
Although agency temporaries received
lower wages and benefits than permanent
workers, they were considered for
permanent positions in all of the plants in
our study. Moreover, because many of
the agency temporaries lacked
manufacturing experience or had poor
work histories, temporary help agencies
may have given these workers access to
jobs that they otherwise would not have
had. In general, we found that the use of
temporary agency employment had little
or no negative impact on the morale of
permanent workers or the temporaries
themselves. In one exception, resentment
built when temporary workers believed
that they were being kept in temporary
status long after they had proven
themselves to be qualified hires.

Seeking Manuscripts
The Institute publishes books on subjects of importance to policymakers, labor economists,
and practitioners who study labor market problems and programs to address them.
The majority of the books we publish originate from our Grant Program, which is
administered by the Institute's in-house staff of professional economists. However, we also
invite submissions of publishable book-length manuscripts and proposals for books from
outside scholars and policy analysts. These submissions will be reviewed promptly by Institute
staff, and manuscripts that appear promising will receive external anonymous peer review.
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W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
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